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NOTE AND COMMENT 
TH:e LAW ScHoor..-In common with all other law schools requiring col-
lege work for admission, this school has suffered a very heavy loss in at-
tendance because of war conditions. This, however, is a matter for pride 
and not for discouragement for it means that our students have gone into 
the army or navy or other branches of the national service in very high ratio 
to their total number. And this is by no means due only to the effect of the 
Selective Service Act for from the very beginning our men have volunteered 
in great spirit and promptness. In 1917 fewer than two-thirds of the then 
senior class were present at the Commencement exercises to receive their 
degrees. Most of them had gone by the middle of May. All this indicates 
that the profession is living up to one of its high traditions of patriotic 
service. 
The University is one of the institutions at which the Government has 
established a branch of the Students' Army Training Corps, and it was early 
decided that the Law School should admit members of the Corps who meet 
the entrance requirements of the school. This decision necessitated the adop-
tion of the four quarters or term plan of organization instead of the two 
semesters and summer session. Except for the S. A. T. C. students, how-
ever, this has roade little difference in the actual giving of the courses. With 
the exception of one or two minor and special topics, such as Mining and 
Irrigation Law and the law of Public Officers, the faculty is offering the 
re.,<>ular curriculum in its entirety. Therefore, those students who are not 
in the S. A. T. C. are taking their work in substantially the usual way. The 
requirements for admission to and the standards of work in the School, and 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
the requirements for graduation have not been and will not be lowered in 
any degree whatever. Sixty-five students have enrolled in the School. Of 
this number three who are members of the S. A. T. C. have not passed their 
physical examinations and may therefore withdraw. The students are classi-
fied as follows : 
Graduate students . • • • • . • . • • • • • . . . . • . . • • . . • . . • • 2 
Th_ird year students . . . . • . . • • . . . . . • • • . . • . . • • • • . • 18 
Second year students . . • . • . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . 15 
First year students .••.••••.....•....•..•.••.•• 29 
Special student . • . • • • • . • . • • . . . . . • • • . . • . . . • . . • . . I 
Total ••••.•.••••••..••••.•..•....•......•.• 65 
Small as this number is it makes up, so far as is known, the second largest 
law school in the United States requiring college work for admission. Har-
vard is reported to have 69 stud~ts. At least eight law schools have sus-
pended entirely and others are giving only one or two years of work during 
the period of the war. 
There has been some redistribution of courses among the faculty. Dean 
Bates has returned after a year's leave of absence and is giving the courses 
in Constitutional Law and International Law. Professor Wilgus, besides 
his regular work, is giving a course in Military Law in accordance with the 
requirements of the War Department. The subject is being intensively de-
veloped upon strictly professional standards of work. Professor Goddard 
bas taken over the courses in Wills and. Property II ; Professor Aigler has 
taken the course in Contracts; Professor Durfee has taken the course in 
Suretyship; Professor Barbour has taken the course in Future and Condi-
tional Interests in Property; and Professor Waite has taken the course in 
Bills and Notes. Otherwise the members of the faculty are offering the same 
courses as those given by them last year. Professor Bunker retired at the 
end of last year and has been made Professor Emeritus upon the Carnegie 
retiring salary and bas resumed the practice of law at Muskegon. Profes-
sor Rood has indefinite leave of absence. Professor Stoner is serving in the 
army with the rank of Captain in the Motor Transport service. Assistant 
Professor Grismore is in the army, serving at Camp Custer. During the 
summer, Dean Bates was engaged in a study for the Government of <:ertain 
phases of international relations, and Professor Aigler was engaged in legal 
and administrative work in the War Trade Board at Washington. The 
Law School has been glad to be able to serve its sister institution, the Uni-
versity of California, whose law faculty was seriously depleted because sev-
eral of its men had gone into the national service, by loaning to it for one 
year Professor Evans Holbrook, who has leave of absence for that period. 
The faculty is thus reduced to ten men, but that number of men of profes-
sorial rank giving their entire time to the teaching of law is as great as is 
engaged in any law school for the present year. 
Despite the almost complete loss of the student editorial board, the LAW 
Ri>vmw will continue publication as usual under charge of the faculty. The 
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number of leading articles upon legal problems of current interest and per-
manent importance assures us in some respects at least the best volume in 
the history of the Rtv.mw. 
Chicago, Ill., May 15, 1918. 
Editor of MICHIGAN LAW Rtvmw. 
Sm: 
In an article upon "German Legal Philosophy" in the Rtvmw for 
March, I9I8, Mr. John M. Zane, after referring, as pro-German propaganda, 
to what he considers an attempt to commit our law schools to a serious study 
of legal philosophy, partly in translations from the German, says in a foot-
note at page 290: 
"I suppose we may acquit the persons, who have been misled, of any con-
sciousness that they were being used as tools of the propaganda, but I hardly 
know what to say of Dean Hall of the Law School of the University of Chi-
cago, who was not ashamed to enter on a warm defence of German sub-
marine methods against merchant vessels. He doubtless has now seen the 
error of his ways." 
In correspondence with the Rtvmw I understand that Mr. Zane admits 
that in making this assertion he relied upon newspaper reports, and that the 
only actual statements of mine to which the above note could be applicable 
were made in a lecture given in Chicago in February, l9I6, in which I said 
that, while it was doubtless a proper defensive measure for an armed mer-
chantman to fire at sight upon an approaching submarine, the latter, in deal-
ing with vessels known to be so armed and instructed, ought not to be re-
quired to give them an opportunity for the first shot; a?so stating that in 
my opinion this conclusion did not require us to treat defensively armed 
merchantmen like belligerent war vessels in our ports, inasmuch as the for-
mer did not go to sea for the purpose o~ attacking enemy vessels, but only 
used their guns when necessary to prevent an attack upon themselves. 
As applied to this expression of views, Mr. Zane's note seems to me so 
misleading that I ask you to publish this explanation of it. 
Very truly yours, 
JAM£S P. HAI;L. 
CHn.n LABOR LAW CAsi;-CoMM£RC£ PoW£R oF CoNGR£ss AND Rts£RV£D 
PoW£Rs oF l'HJS STA't£s.-The decision in the Child Labor Law case, Hammer 
v. Dagenhart, - U. S. -, 62 L. ed. -, decided June 3, 1918, would have 
caused much less surPrise twenty-five years ago than it did when announced 
last June, for it is based upon two constitutional provisions concerning which 
the much wider and more varied experience of the last quarter century had 
developed theories, better defined and sounder than those of the earlier period. 
Those two provisions are the Tenth Amendment regarding the powers re-
served to the States and the Commerce Clause. There has been an astonish-
ing amount of faulty reasoning about the Tenth Amendment in its relation 
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to Federal powers. Over and over again courts and writers have argued as 
if certain powers, or powers of certain kinds had been reserved to the States 
and therefore that the Federal Government could not possibly have or exer-
cise powers that touched those fields; or, to put it otherwise, that the Federal 
Government could not exercise even its granted powers, as those over com-
merce or to make treaties, if such exercise would affect matters concerning 
which the States also possessed power. But this is a diametrically wrong way 
to approach the distribution of powers between the Federal and the State 
Governments. Certain powers have been given to the Federal Government. In 
the nature of the case, and as the Supreme Court has declared repeatedly, 
these powers, many of them stated only in geenral outline, are and must be 
capable of indefinit~ expansion, or more accurately their application is and 
must be to a changing and always increasing number of objects and situations. 
As this process of extending the application of the commerce power to 
new subjects proceeds, it will necessarily follow in a great many cases that 
powers of the States, the exercise of which would conflict with these exer-
tions of Federal power, must be suspended pro tanto during the life of the 
Federal law. There are many familiar examples of this. The States may in 
general adopt and administer their own laws of quarantine, of pilotage, of 
the regulation of internal traffic, and the sale of goods, but if Congress should 
enact a law, as unquestionably it has the power to do, regulating quarantine 
at all ports, all State laws in conflict therewith would necessarily be suspended 
at least during the life of the Federal quarantine statute. Morgan S. S. Co. 
v. La. Bnard of Health, n8 U. S. 455, 463, The same results would follow 
the enactment of a Federal pilotage scheme. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of 
Philadelphio, 12 How. 299; Anderson v. Pac. S.S. Co., 225 U. S. 187. 
Congressional regulations of interstate commerce as to subjects of trans-
portation and as to methods of transportation have caused innumerable re-
strictions upon the power of the States in regard to these matters. Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. l; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; The Daniel Ball, 
10 Wall. 557; Northern Pac. Ry. v. Washingto1i, 222 U. S. 370; Wabash, etc. 
Ry. Co. v. Illinois, n8 U. S. 557; Mich. Cent. Ry. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59; 
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1. 
To come still nearer to the case in hand, when Congress enacted the Pure 
Food Law, it of course prevented the transportation into other states of food 
made or put up in violation of its terms, thus diminishing the market and 
hence indirectly affecting manufacture of goods even though made in com-
plete conformity with the State law. Seven Cases of Eckman's Alterative v. 
U. S., 239 U. S. 510. When Congress prohibited the carrying of lottery tick-
ets in interstate commerce, even though the lottery as an institution were 
legally recognized b:Yc the State, it necessarily diminished the importance and 
value which the institution would have had except for this restriction.' Lot-
tery Case, 188 U. S. 321. 
The Webb-Kenyon Act, Act of March 1, 1913, 37 Stat. 66g, c. go, by which 
Congress authorized the States to exercise their police power in regard to 
the importation and use of liquor from other states has been held to be an 
exercise of the Congressional power over commerce whereby the law of one 
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State may effectively restrict the market for goods manufactured in another 
State, though the manufacture in such other State were entirely lawful. 
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 3u. Unless the pro-
posed Federal prohibition amendment shall be adopted, undoubtedly each 
state may prohibit or permit by license or otherwise the sale and use of 
liquor. Nevertheless by the Congressional act a partial prohibition in inter-
state commerce is in effect produced, and that prohibition limits the powers 
of States quite as effectively as the Supreme Court says it was sought to be 
limited by the Child Labor Law. 
The same problem may be approached from the point of view of the exer-
cise of aether power and with the same results. The President is given the 
power to make treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
(Art. II, § I, Cl. 2.) Treaties may concern any subject proper for inter-
national treatment not prohibited by the Constitution. They may then and 
commonly do relate to many matters of great importance to the State intern-
ally, such as the purchase, sale, holding, and descent of real property, the 
right of the nationals of other powers to engage in business in the United 
States, and an indefinite number of matters more or less associated with 
these. The United States has repeatedly executed treaties affecting these 
matters, which are of course subject in general to the powers of the States, 
and yet when the paramount power of the national government is·properly 
exercised the power of the State government is necessarily correspondingly 
restricted or suspended. Fairfa~s Devisees, 7 Cranch 627; Ware v. Hylton, 
3 Dall. 242; Hauenslein v. Ly11ham, IOO U. S. 483. 
The restricting effect· which the exercise of the treaty making power has 
upon State authority over matters which would ordinarily be regarded as 
within the so-called powers of the States has been admfrably discussed in 
Corwin's "The Treaty Making Power and National Supremacy." The con-
trary view, but one which seems indefensible is ably presented in Tucker's 
"!,imitations Upon the Treaty Making Power." 
It ls submitted that the theoretically correct mode of determining what 
powers are reserved to the State or the people under the Tenth Amendment 
is to first ascertain what powers are expressly or impliedly granted to the 
Federal Government or prohibited to the States by the Federal Constitution 
and to subtract these from the totality of governmental powers. And this 
is the mode actually taken by the Supreme Court in the great majority oi 
cases, some of which have been cited above. 
If this reasoning be sound, it follows that there were not two but only 
one real question to be asked and answered by the Supreme Court in decid-
ing the Child Labor case, and that question was: Is the Child Labor Law 
within the scope of the authority conferred upon Congress by the Commerce 
Clause? With entire deference we believe that the answer to this question 
should have been in the affirmative and that is the view taken by the. four 
dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court and convincingly presented in the 
opinion by Mr. Justice Hor.M:es. In other words, if this is a proper regula-
tion of interstate commerce, the law does not infringe at all upon the so-
called reserved powers of the States. In taking up this question the Supreme 
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Court seems to us to have fallen into a logical fallacy at the very outset of 
the majority opinion, and then to have put an interpretation upon several of 
its former decisions which is not tenable. Mr. Justice DAY, who has deliv-
ered many opinions showing an enlightened and forward looki11g view con-
cerning legislation dealing with social problems, quotes from Gi"bbons v. 
Ogden, as follows: 
"It is the power to regulate, that is to prescribe the rule by which 
commerce is to be governed." 
about which he remarks : 
"In other words, the power is one to control the means by which 
commerce is carried on, which is directly the contrary of the as-
sumed right to forbid commerce from moving and thus destroying 
it as to particular commodities. But it is insisted that adjudged 
cases in this court establish the doctrine that the power to regulate 
given to Congress incidentally includes the authority to prohibit the 
movement of ordinary commodities and therefore that the subject 
is not open for discussion. The cases demonstrate the contrary. 
They rest upon the character of the particular. subjects dealt with 
and the fact that t.1ie scope of governmental authority, state or 
national, possessed over them is such that the authority to prohibit 
is as to them but the exertion of the power to regulate." 
But is it not quite clear that the power "to prescribe the rule by which 
commerce is to be governed", which is Chief Justice MARSHAI.:r.'s formula, 
is very much more comprehensive than "the power to control the means by 
which commerce is carried on", which is Mr. Justice DAy's statement? To 
prescribe rules by which commerce is to be governed is obviously to control 
the whole life of commerce including dealing not only with the instrumental-
ities of commerce but with commerce itself and its subject matter. Perhaps 
it is the narrower interpretation that the power includes only the right to 
control the means of commerce which- led the majority of the court in the 
present case to the conclusion that Congress has no power to prohibit com-
merce except where the subject matter of such commerce is in and of itself 
pernicious and productive of injury after the act of commerce is closed. 
With great respect it is submitted that this cannot be the correct view. That 
a power to regulate includes the power to prohibit in proper cases has been 
established in many kinds of regulation. It is sufficient here to refer to pro-
hibitions of commerce of which well known examples may be found in the 
following cases. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (liquor); the Lottery case, 188 
321; Hipnlite Egg Co. v. U.S., 220 U. S. 45 (food); U.S. v. Lexfogtcn Mill 
& Elevator Co., 232 U. S. 399; Hoke v. U.S., 2Z7 U. S. 3o8 (white slave); 
Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U. S. 470 (white slave). 
The court, in seeking to distinguish these cases from the one before it in 
order to establish its proposition that prohibition is permissible under the 
commerce clause only when the subject matter of such commerce may be 
productive of injury arising after the commerce is completed, falls into what 
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seems to us an error which perhaps may be traced to a sentence in U. S. v. 
E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, to the effect that manufacture precedes com-
merce. This is of course true. But it is an obvious non-sequitur to say that 
therefore Congress cannot exert its power over commerce merely because 
such exercise would through commerce indirectly affect manufacture. Cer-
tainly the commerce power was not given to Congress for the sole purpose 
of regulating and promoting commerce as an end in and of itself. There is 
abundant evidence that it was given not only to prevent the abuses of which 
some of the states had been guilty in dealing with commerce under the Arti· 
cles of Confederation and of promoting commerce as a means of promotion 
of the general welfare, but also for the purpose of securing that general 
welfare by any regulation of commerce productive of such effect and not 
forbidden by other clauses in the constitution. What possible difference can 
it make whether the evil aimed at may have been caused before the particu-
lar act of transportation has taken place or after it? If the privilege of such 
interstate transportation and commerce be greatly enlarged the market for 
the goods transported thus increases the scale of manufacture and the evil 
which such manufacture produces. That evil in this case includes of course 
the injury to the child's health, moral and spiritual welfare, and the cutting 
off of its opportunity for a reasonable amount of education. 
The dissenting opinion makes it clear that the real and substantial infrac· 
tion· of the powers of the state governments is caused by denying to Congress 
the power to regulate this matter and thus putting it within the power of the 
several states to ship their goods into other states, not only without the con-
sent of the latter but contrary to their established public policy in regard to 
child labor or whatever else may be involved. Of course the states did not 
have such extraterritorial power before the adoption of the constitution, and 
it is absurd to suppose that it was intended to be given to them by that in-
strument. In the argument of the present case, the government showed very 
clearly that one effect of the existence of legislation forbidding child labor 
in some states and the non-existence of such legislation in others is to drive 
the greedy and conscienceless manufacturers from the states with this en-
lightened legislation to those which have it not Not only that, but the goods 
made in the latter class of states must now be received and may be sold in 
the other states and to consumers who may have conscientfo!,ls scruples against 
the use of such goods and who have no means of knowing whether in fact 
child labor has been employed in the manufacture. 
The scientific and popular opinion is so strong for the prohibition of child 
labor in this country that it is certain to be obtained sooner or later. It 
would seem clear that this object may be obtained by an exercise of the 
taxing power of Congress under the doctrine laid down in McCray v. U. S., 
~U&~ RER 
Tm: STATU'tt oF Usss AND A<::rJ.VF. TuusTs.-To explain the survival of 
uses, alias trusts, after the Statute of Uses, one is probably justified in as-
suming a sympathetic attitude toward this Equitable institution on the part 
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of the Common Law Judges. Maitland, Equity, 29. But, however predis-
posed the Judges might be, they would have to satisfy themselves, perhaps 
others as well, that they were interpreting rather than nullifying the Statute. 
Only such uses could be saved as could be "distinguished." The case of the 
use raised upon a chattel interest is clear enough, as it was without the let-
ter, and fairly without the mischief, of the Statute. The case of the use 
upon a use, while obscure at an earlier day, was elucidated by Mr. Ames, 
who found the key to the riddle in the fact that, at the time of the enact-
ment and for a century thereaftei:, there was no such thing as a use upon 
a use, the declaration of a second use being void for repugnancy, in Equity 
;i,s well as at Law. Lectures on Legal History, 243. The case of the active 
use, however, seems to the writer to need further explanation than it has 
yet received. 
The reason usually assigned today for the saving of active trusts is that 
this is necessary in order to carry out the purpose of the trust-that other-
wise the intent of the creator of the trust would be defeated. Since intention 
was allowed to go by the board in the case of the passive use, this argument 
involves an implied term: that the reprehensible intent in the one case, to 
avoid feudal burdens et cetera, the very mischief recited in the Statute, mer-
ited no consideration: while the legitimate intent in the other case, to provide 
superior management et cetera, did merit consideration, even though the 
abuses of uses were inseparable from it. At a later period, when the inter-
ests which the Statute was designed to protect (viz., the King's feudal reve-
nues; Maitland, Equity, 34. 35) had disappeared, and when, on the other 
hand, concern for the intention of donors had increased, this might well pass 
as the rationale of the established doctrine of active uses. But, as an expla-
nation of the origin of that doctrine, it is open to the objection that the 
judges of Henry's time, who were never much concerned with intention, 
could hardly have brought themselves to consciously place the purposes of 
trustors above the interests the invasion of which was so vehemently de-
nounced in the Statute. It is notable that the older authorities on the active 
use give no hint of this purpose theory. 
Mr. Ames said, in a passing remark, that the "special or active trust-
was always distinct from a use, and therefore neither executed as such by 
the Statute of Uses nor forgeitable by Stat. 33 Henry VIII!' Lectures on 
Legal History, 245: Of his three authorities, Bacon fairly supports his posi-
tion; Sanders merely quotes Bacon, while in another passage not cited by 
Mr. Ames (Sanders, Uses, 5th ed. 253) he puts forward the purpose theory; 
and the passage from Chudleigh's case is very obscure. Mr. Ames is, how-
ever, supported by the well known Note in Brooke's Abridgement, appar-
ently our oldest authority on the doctrine of the active trust, "Otherwise if 
he says that the feoffees shall take the profits and deliver them to J. N., this 
does not make a use in J. N., for he never has them unless by the hands of 
the feoffees. Bro. Ab. Feoff, al Uses, 52; I Gray's Cases, 410. Mr. Ames 
must not be understood as asserting a mere distinction in nomenclature, for 
the terms "use" and "trust", together with "confidence", were always used 
more or less interchangeably until after the Statute, and, if a distinction in 
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terms had been clearly recognized, it would have operated to bring the active 
trust within the Statute by virtue of specification, since the Statute consis-
tently uses the phrase, "use, confidence or trust''. The distinction, then, must 
be between the passive use, confidence or trust, later specified as "use", and 
the active use, confidence or ~ust, later specified as "trust'', or "special trust'', 
and the distinction must be more fundamental than that which exists in the 
professional mind today, between the passive and the active trust 
The Note of Brooke's, supra, is susceptible of this interpretation: that, 
in the case he puts, J. N. had no enforcible right, either at la\v or in equity. 
If t11is were true, the case of the special trust would stand on the same foot-
ing as the use upon a use. The writer has been unable to find any authority, 
except that of unendorsed petitions, to indicate that the Chancellor did en-
force this sort of confidence prior to the Statute. But, on the other hand, 
he finds no authority that he did not, and it seems unlikely that he would have 
hesitated at this case in view of the fact that he was already dealing with 
accounting of fiduciaries. I Ames Cases on Equity, 446, n. 1. 
It is submitted, with diffidence, that the solution of this puzzle must run 
something like this. At the time of the Statute, English land was so largely 
held to uses, (passive uses, of course) that property in land was thought of as 
a duality-seisin and use. Even when the equitable relation of feoffee and 
cestui did not obtain, when the legal estate was unencumbered by an out-
standing use, the idea of duality remained and the tenant was said to be 
seised to his own use, the use being characterized as "conjoined" to the 
seisin. When the use was "divided" from the seisin, the cestui usually had. 
possession, that tangible element of property which at that day, even more 
than now, approximated ownership. Holmes, Early Equity, II Set. Essays, 
712. Whether the Chancellor would protect the cestui's ·possession by en-
joining interference .by the feoffee does not appear, but he would protect it 
by requiring the feoffee to transfer the seisin to cestui. Contemporary theo-
retical discussion of the nature of the use we have not, but how can we 
doubt that the passive use, the common use, was regarded as property-the 
better part of property? On the other hand, the uncommon active, or spe-
cial, confidence would almost of necessity be thought of as distinct In the 
one case, there was possession; in the other, a mere right to an accounting. 
On one side, is the common use, an indispensable element of ownership, 
whether conjoined with the seisin or divided from it; on the other, the spe-
cial trust, neither an indispensable nor a common feature of ownership. 
Then comes the Statute. It contemplates, in terms, a use, confidence or 
trust which is an estate in the land, for the cestui shall "stand and be seised in 
lawful seisin, estate and possession of and in the same lands, tenements and 
hereditaments, of and in such like estates as they had or shall have in use, 
trust or confidence of or in the same." Again, if we may believe Bacon, the 
clumsy frame of sections I and II, providing in parallel clauses for the cases 
of seisin of one or more to the use of "others", and that of the seisin of 
several to the use of "any of them", was dictated by the necessity of avoiding 
the third parallel case of the conjoined use. Bacon, Law Tracts, 2d ed., 336. 
The Statute, then, contemplated the common passive use, -confidence or trust, 
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and not the special active use, confidence or trust. Brooke's Note, then, 
should be read thus: "If he says that the feoffees shall take the profits and 
deliver them to J. N., this does not make a use in J. N." (meaning a use 
executed by the Statute, for that is undoubtedly what Brooke was talking 
about), because J. N. had not the common use, with the right of possession, 
but a mere right to an accounting, "for he never has them [the profits] unless 
by the hands of the feoffees". And we may believe that Brooke, if he had 
been pressed, would have said, as Spence said at a later day, (I Spence, Eq. 
Jur., 466), that the common use was in the feoffees, since it was not in J. N. 
and did not result to the feoffer, and since they were to have possession and 
t;tke the profits in the first instance. He would not have felt that there was 
repugnancy here, as in Tyrrel's Case, for the common use in the feoffees was 
a different thing from the special use declared to J. N. 
The attempt here is merely to explain the genesis of the doctrine of the 
active trust in the case of the direction to collect and pay over the profits. 
Undoubtedly, at a later time, with the advent of the purpose theory, and aided 
by the lapse of many of the interests which were infringed by the use, the 
doctrine comes to have a scope which cannot be explained in the foregoing 
manner. 
If these conjectures be correct, then the story of the development of 
equitable interests from merely personal rights to property rights must be 
told in two chapters, first of the passive use which in the fullness of its 
development was struck down, as an equitable institution, by the Statute, and 
second of the active use which, by reason of its immaturity, was saved from 
the Statute and pursued its more gradual growth. When the passive use 
was re-established, under the name of trust, the conditions which had fav-
ored the "reifying" of the passive trust in the earlier period had so far dis-
appeared that it partook of the nature of the active trust. E. N. D. 
Fuu:. FAITH AND C&eDIT AND ]URISDICTION.-The judgment of a sister 
state, when assailed by collateral attack, is often said to occupy a position in-
termediate between foreign and domestic judgments. Though the older 
American cases were inclined to examine into the merits of any foreign judg-
ment, the present tendency is toward the adoption of the English view ac-
cording to which a foreign judgment may be attacked collaterally only for 
want of jurisdiction or fraud. Dicey, Conflict of Laws (ed. 2) Ch. XVII; 
see note to Tremblay v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 97 Me. 547, in 94 Am. St. 
Rep. 521, 538. But whereas any statement of jurisdictional facts in a foreign 
judgment is presumptive only, a domestic judgment is free from collateral 
attack on the ground of jurisdiction, except where lack of jurisdiction ap-
pears upon the face of the record. I BJ.ACK, JUDGMENTS (ed. 2), § 27+ The 
courts of New York have declined to accord this favoured position to do-
mestic judgments and apparently make no distinction between domestic judg-
ments and those of a sister state in this matter. Ferg11son v. Crawford, 70 
N. Y. 253, 26 Am. Rep. 589. In view of the so-called 'full faith and credit 
clause' of the constitution (Art. IV, §1), it is difficult to see why the judg-
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ment of a sister state should be open to any form of collateral attack to 
which it is not open in the state where the judgment is rendered. This 
would seem to follow from the familiar· statement of Chief Justice Marshall 
in Hampto11 v. -~lcC01111el, 3 Wheat. 234 (affirming the doctrine of Mills v. 
Duryee, 7 Cranch 481), which in the opinion of Justice Holmes is still a cor-. 
rect exposition of the law. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 236-7. 
At all events it is clear that the judgment of a sister state may not be at-
tacked collaterally upon the merits, and accordingly it becomes important to 
determine what matters are jurisdictional. Ordinarily the line of demarca-
tion between the two is easily drawn, but when the ;udgment is rendered by 
a court of general jurisdiction in pursuance of a statutory or constitutional 
provision, the problem of delimiting jurisdiction becomes acute. Justice 
Holmes in Famitleroy v. Lum, supra, has stated this very neatly: "No doubt 
it sometimes may be difficult to decide whether certain words in a statute 
are directed to jurisdiction or to merits, but the distinction between the two 
is plain. One goes to the power, the other only to the duty of the court. * * * 
Whether a given statute is intended simply to establish a rule of substantive 
law, and thus to define the duty of the court, or is meant to limit its power, 
is a question of construction and common sense. When it affects a court of 
general jurisdiction and deals with a matter upon which that court must 
pass, we naturally are slow to read ambiguous words, as meaning to leave 
the judgment open to dispute, or as intended to do more than fix the rule by 
which the courts should decide." Any reasonable doubt, then, should be re-
solved in favour of jurisdiction, and it is encouraging to find that in the 
most recent case in which this question has been presented to the Supreme 
Court the majority of the justices took this view. 
Under the law of Minnesota, if execution on a judgment against a do-
mestic corporation is returned unsatisfied, the court at the suit of a judg-
ment creditor may sequestrate the property and appoint a receiver for the 
same. If in such suit the receiver presents a petition asserting that any con-
stitutional or statutory liability of the stockholders ~ists and that resort 
thereto is necessary, the court may upon proper hearing make an order 
ratably assessing the stockholders on account of such liability and direct 
that the assessment be paid to the receiver. The court's order is made "con-
clusive as to all matters relating to the amount, propriety and necessity of the 
assessment'' (Rev. Laws 1905, §§ 3173, 3184-3187), and if payment is not 
made the duty devolves upon the receiver of enforcing the court's order 
against defaulting stockholders wherever found. The order which produced 
the present controversy was made by the Minnesota court in a sequestration 
suit against the American Biscuit Company of Crookston, a Minnesota cor-
poration. The receiver brought suit upon thi~ order against a defaulting 
stockholder in North Dakota. The defendant contended that under the 
terms of the provision of the constitution of Minnesota (Art. X, !§ 3), which 
imposed a liability upon stockholders of corporations "except those organ-
ized for the purpose of carrying on manufacturing or mechanical business", 
the American Biscuit Company belonged to the class whose stockholders were 
excepted from liability, and that hence the Minnesota court was without 
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jurisdiction to make the order in question. This argument prevailed in North 
Dakota (32 N. D. s.~6) ; upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United 
States it was held (Justices Clarke, Pitney and Brandeis, dissenting), that 
the court of North Dakota did not give to the proceeding in Minnesota the 
full faith and credit to which it was entitled under the constitution and laws 
of the United States. Mari1i v. Aiegedahl (1918), 38 Sup. Ct. 452. 
This decision seems eminently sound. The Minnesota court, by the law 
of its organization, was empowered to take cognizance of, hear and deter-
mine the sequestration suit and the receiver's petition for an assessment. 
Clearly it had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit. Cooper v. Rey-
n.olds, 10 Wall. 3o8, 316. Whether or not the stockholder against whom the 
order was sought to be enforced in North Dakota was personally a party to 
the original suit in Minnesota does not appear, but it is a matter of no con-
sequence. The rule in Minnesota, which is also the general rule, is that, as 
a stockholder, he was sufficiently represented by the corporation to be bound 
by the order so far as that order determined the character and insolvency of 
the corporation and the propriety of the assessment. Hawkins v. Glenn, 
131 l.T. S. 319; Bernheimer v. Converse, 2o6 U. S. 516. See also Royal Ar-
canum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531. It follows that the Minnesota court had 
jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the person. The defendant, therefore, 
was driven to the contention that Article X, § 3 (quoted supra) of the Con-
stitution of Minnesota was directed to the jurisdiction of the court and not 
to the merits of the decision. He was able to show by several Minnesota 
cases; e.g., Hastings Malting Co. v. Iro1i Range Brewing Co., 65 Minn. 28 
(manufacture and brewing of lager beer); Vencedor Investment Ca. v. High-
land C. and P. Co., 125 Minn. 20 (generating electricity), that the original 
order in Minnesota was incorrect. If the brewing of beer or generating of 
electricity entitles a corporation, as a manufacturing concern, to e."<:emption 
from the constitutional provision, it requires some hardihood to deny the 
"manufacture" of biscuits. Such a finding was, of course, implicit in the 
order. But if the order was erroneous, it should have been corrected by ap-
plication to the court which made it, or by appeaL The constitutional pro-
ivison does not aim to deal directly with the jurisdiction of courts; rather 
does it declare a general rule of liability for stockholders of corporatiohs, 
excepting therefrom corporations of a certain class. So far as mere words 
go, the Statute of Frauds might seem to apply to jurisdiction; yet it is doubt-
ful if any court ever regarded that statute as affecting aught save the merits. 
Only by a strange distortion of language can the constitutional provision be 
regarded as jurisdictional. The effort of Justice Clarke in his dissenting opin-
ion to support such a proposition is far from ~onvincing. He laid great stress 
upon a number of Minnesota cases, of which Dwfonel v. Kramer, 87 Minn. 
3g2, is typical. It was there held that a policy holder in an insolvent mutual 
insurance company, against whom a general assessment on the policy holders 
was sought to be enforced, might successfully defend upon the ground that 
his policy was an "ordinary contract of insurance" issued on receipt -0£ a cash 
premium and did not conform to the general plan. In other words he was 
allowed to put forward a personal defense. So too an alleged stockholder 
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might show that in fact he was not a stockholder or that he had paid the 
assessment. Such decisions do not call in question the jurisdiction of the 
court which ordered the assessment. They do not involve the problem of 
the principal case. . 
The effect of this decision appears to be that the judgment of a state 
court is conclusive throughout the Union as to all questions upon which it 
would be conclusive in the state where it is rendered. It affords consequently 
an interesting commentary upon a common interpretation put upon two 
much discussed cases: Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, and Natfonal 
Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S. 257. W. T. B. 
Tm: CcNTl!NT oF CoVl!NANTs IN L!!ASl!s.-Among the many troublesome 
problems in law those arising out of "covenants running with the land" are 
not the least. It is quite clear that in order :for a covenant to "run" there 
must be an intimacy of relationship between it and the land, or, more prop-
erly, the estate, with which it passes. It is, then, vitally important to con-
sider in each case the subject matter, the content of the covenant, and this 
matter of relationship. 
Until recently courts and writers have with unfortunate unanimity con-
tented themselves with laying down the familiar :formula, "The covenant 
must touch and concern the land". Not until Professor Bigelow published 
his article on "The Content of Covenants in Leases", 12 MICH. L. Rr:v. 639, 
30 LAW QUART. Rr:v. 319, did the subject receive in print the analysis and 
careful consideration it deserved. 
A recent English case, Barnes v. City of London Real Property Co. (1918), 
2 Ch. 18, however fully one may agree with the conclusion arrived at, is a 
good example of the lack of intelligent analysis so common in these cases. 
The lessee there sued the assignee of the lessor for breach of a covenant 
by the lessor to provide a housekeeper to keep the demised office in order. 
Sargent, J., said, "Then there comes the question whether the obligation ran 
with the land. The Conveyancing Act of 1881, s. II, enacts that tlie obliga-
tion of a covenant entered into by a lessor with reference to 'the subject-
matter of the lease' shall bind the reversionary interest. Was this an obliga-
tion with reference to the subject-matter of the lease? I do not think the 
law was intended to be altered at all by that enactment as regards the char-
acter of the obligation. I think the words of the statute expressed the same 
idea as that conveyed by the old phrase 'touching the land.' After consid-
ering the various authorities which have been cited, and particularly the case 
of Clegg v. Hands (44 Ch. D. 503), I cannot entertain a doubt that this obli-
gation to clean, or to clean and dust by means of the provision of a house-
keeper for the purpose, is something with reference to the subject-matter of 
the lease; certainly it has at least as close reference to the subject-matter 
of the lease as an obligation not to sell any. beer on the property except beer 
provided by the lessor. In my judgment this is clearly something that touches 
the subject-matter. It affects the value of the rooms for the purpose for 
which they were let while in the occupation of the lessees. It seems to me 
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to be a very valuable right of the lessees to have the cleaning and dusting per-
formed by some one who is appointed for the purpose by the landlords for 
all the tenants." Clegg v. Hands, it should be observed, was in equity and 
the court there pointed out that whatever might be the plaintiff's position as 
assignee of the reversion to enforce the defendant's covenant as lessee to sell 
on the premises only ale, etc. bought of the lessors, at any rate plaintiff as 
assignee of the benefit of stich covenant should succeed on the principle of 
Tnlk v. Mox hay. 
It may be said that generally, though not necessarily (See 12 MICH. L. 
Ri::v. 645, 646), covenants that are beneficial to the lessee or lessor as s11ch 
and only so long as he occupies such position have the necessary intimacy 
~f relationship. See ·Vyvyan v. Arthur, 1 B. & C. 410. Such test, however, 
is of value only when it is the benefit side of the covenant that is under con-
sideration. It seems clear that assignees of the lessee in the principal case 
would have been entitled to enforce the covenant as one running with the 
estate of the lessee. The question before the court, however, was whether 
the burden of the covenant was binding upon the defendant by virtue of his 
being assignee of the reversion. The covenantor's totality of rights, privi-
leges, and powers as owner of the reversion was unaffected by the obligation 
of the covenant, hence the problem cannot be settled by the application of 
such test. 
In 12 MtcH. L. Riw. 656, Professor Bigelow has said, "Whether the burden 
of a covenant by the lessor that benefits the lessee as such should merely for 
that reason follow the reversion into the hands of an assignee is more diffi-
cult of decision. It is arguable that the second section of 32 H. 8, ch. 34. 
which gives the lessee and his assigns the same rights against the assignee 
of the lessor as against the lessor will produce the same result that follows 
from the subordinate nature of the lessee's estate in the situation just con-
sidered, and that since the covenant is made by the lessor for the purpose of 
benefiting the lessee's estate it is for this reason alone within the purview 
of the statute. So far as the decisions go those that deal with the liability 
of the assignee of the lessor under these circumstances hold him to be 
bound." Citing Mansel v. Norton, L. R. 22, Ch. D. 76g; Gerzebek v. Lord, 
33 N. J. L. 240; Myers v. Burns, 35 N. Y. 26g; Storandt v. Vogel & Binder 
Co., 140 App. Div. (N. Y.) 671. The principal case in its conclusion lends 
support to the view expressed. R. W. A. 
